# Syntax # Article ### Use of the Article To explain various asymmetries with regard to the (non-)use of definite article in Quenya as compared to English, we will exploit the distinction of semantic and pragmatic uniqueness as originally introduced by Löbner1 and some generalizations made by Ortmann2 and Schwarz3 over weak-strong article splits encountered in many languages. #### Nominal Concept Types In his theory Löbner proposes a lexical distinction of noun types in how they classify the universe:
- \[-R\] nouns point to a member of a class: *rock, architect, chair*; - \[+R\] nouns require a \[-R\] noun to bound them to the scene: *wheel, sister, head*; - \[-U\] nouns might have several instances within the same scene: *tree, brother, minister*; - \[+U\] nouns pick out a unique memeber within the scene: *Peter, weather, father*.
Lexical units have their default combination \[±U\]\[±R\], but virtually each of them can undergo a type shift into any other combination:
- \[-U\] → \[+U\]: *a rock* → *the rock*; - \[+U\] → \[-U\]: *the mother of a child* → *a late mother*; - \[-R\] → \[+R\]: *a book* → *my book*; - \[+R\] → \[-R\]: *the king of Spain* → *a king*.
Nouns which interpretation coincides with their lexical combination are then called *nouns* of this type, and which interpretation diverges from that combination are then called *concepts* of this type. The four possible types are then called:
\[-U\]\[+U\]
\[-R\]sortalindividual
\[+R\]relationalfunctional

The terminology distinguishes the noun's *underlying type* (eg. *functional noun*, FN) from its *actual use* (eg. *functional concept*, FC).

#### Semantic vs Pragmatic Uniqueness It is crucial then to distinguish between individual and functional *nouns* on one hand which are lexically unique, and *concepts* which uniqueness results from the context (linguistic or extra-linguistic). In his work Ortmann claims that this distinction results in the fundamental split of the article use: concepts are marked in a more explicit way. It's especially easy to obseve such tendency in languages which show two types of definite articles — weak and strong — like German. The matter is not only complicated by the fact that articles tend to invade into other categories4, but also by fuzzy cases which could be analyzed either as semantic or pragmatic. The latter especially results in the article variation in closely related languages. #### Strong Article in Quenya The first major difference we can point between Quenya and English is the (non-)use of the article with unique nouns, where it is logically redundant:
typeQuenyaEnglish
SNantanen **hatal**I cast **a spear**
RNyulda **heruo**drink of **a lord**
IN**anar** caluva**the sun** shall shine
FN**lambe** Eldaiva**the language** of the Eldar
However, it occurs with unique concepts to mark the incongruence:
typeQuenyaEnglish
ICá sac' **i fendë**close **the door**
FC**i yávë** mónalyo**the fruit** of thy womb

Many languages diverge here from the Ortmann's statement where Quenya adheres to it: they use the weak (semantic) article in the *immediate use* IC like in the sentence above. Schwarz shows that the weak article is used without anaphoricity. The immediate use IC is pragmatic but non-anaphoric. Löbner's and Ortmann's uniqueness scale avoids to include immediate use IC altogether.

#### The Threshold of Semantic and Pragmatic Uniqueness Some corner cases which don't clearly belong either to semantic or pragmatic uniqueness are:
- Bridging: "John bought *a book* today. **The author** is French". - Autophoric nouns: "He bought **the car** *that was shown on TV*". - Non-lexical FC: "**The highest** *mountain*".
##### Non-Lexical Functional Concepts **Non-lexical FC** is a concept where semantic uniqueness comes about by **syntactic** structure and semantic **composition** rather than by the lexical meaning of the head noun. In particular, these are nouns combined **with ordinal numbers**, and **with superlative** forms of attributive adjectives. In these cases uniqueness is achieved by the lexical meaning of the *modifier*. ##### Complex FC in Quenya Quenya superlative adjectives do **not** take the article5, and neither do the determining adjectives like *last, next, only*:
- *métima hrestallo círa* \[MC/221\] “leave the last shore”

To the same list of adjectives belongs *same*, yet Tolkien gives an example *i imya* “the same”. \[PE23/134\]

While no canonical example of ordinal number with a noun exists, they belong to the same category, and it is expected to observe a lack of the article with them too. ##### Bridging Bridging or ‘definite associative anaphora’ (DAA) describes a noun, typically a functional noun, which is uniquely defined by its relation to a previously mentioned noun:
- I looked into *the room*. **The ceiling** was very high - *My new car* needed repairing, **the motor** was broken - I've just been to *a wedding*. **The bride** wore blue.
Based on the world knowledge, the hearer knows that at a wedding, there should be one and only one bride, a room has only one ceiling and a car needs a motor. DAAs combine properties of pragmatic uniqueness (by virtue of anaphoricity) and semantic uniqueness (by virtue of involving a FN). It is therefore natural for there to be considerable variation in the use of articles. ##### DAA in Quenya Tolkien himself explains the use of the article with DAA on at least one occasion, — *i falmalinnar*: > The waves are implied in *ilye tier*: \[…\] Those routes had naturally been over the waves. \[PE23/134\] There's no other canonical example of DAA in the current corpus of Quenya, but two sentences are close approximations to such:
- *alcar mi Tarmenel na Erun ar mi cemen rainë i hínin* \[VT44/32\]. "Glory to God in the highest and on earth peace, good will toward men". 'The children' is definite in the reference to Eru. - *an cé mo quernë cendelë númenna, i hyarma tentanë Melcorello* \[VT49/6-8\]. "For if one turned the face westward, the left hand pointed away from Melkor". 'The left hand' is definite in the reference to *one*.

The first example *Eru → the children* is a 'relational anaphora', and the second example *one → the left hand* is 'part-whole' DAA. Even though Schwarz and Ortmann discuss how part-whole and maker-product DAAs differ in their semantic-pragmatic dichotomy in some languages, the examples above show that in Quenya **any** DAA is marked by the article.

##### Autophoric Nouns Autophoric nouns establish their unique reference by a restrictive relative clause. Context-dependency affects the weak-strong article choice, but it seems Quenya in general requires an article uniformly (even when the relative clause is reduced) unless superceded by another determiner:
- *Átaremma i ea han Ea* \[VT43/12\] "our Father who art in Heaven" - *manar i·ennor i me·kenner* \[MQ: PE22/124\] "who are the persons that we saw?"
In a bit confused way, to this list can also belong this line from *Namárie*:
- *Vardo tellumar yassen tintilar i eleni* “beneath the vaults of Varda wherein the stars tremble”
This is how Tolkien explains the use of *i eleni*: > Thus in Galadriel’s lament it is said *tintilar i eleni*: that is, those stars that adorned or shone through the transparent roofs of the Domes of Varda, which were not all the visible stars, nor in fact the actual stars of the firmament of the outer world. \[PE23/133\] Or, in other words, *stars* *→ that tremble in the vaults of Varda*: even though the noun itself is not syntactically autophoric, it is implicitly.
#### Quenya as a Split I System The simplified scale of uniqueness suggested by Löbner and Ortmann: *deictic SN* < *anaphoric SN* < *autophoric SN* < *DAA* < *non-lexical IC, FC* < *IN, FN* < *proper names* where the cut-off position for the article use varies from language to language:
- English: *deictic SN* < **\[*anaphoric SN* < *autophoric SN* < *DAA* < *non-lexical IC, FC* < *IN, FN*\]** < *proper names* - Quenya: *deictic SN* < **\[*anaphoric SN* < *autophoric SN* < *DAA*\]** < *non-lexical IC, FC* < *IN, FN* < *proper names*
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##### Footnotes 1: Journal of Semantics 4: 279–326, 1985 2: Frames and Concept Types: 293-321, 2014 3: [Two Types of Definites in Natural Language](https://florianschwarz.net/FSDiss/FS-Diss_gradschoolformat.pdf), Florian Schwarz, 2009 4: as in Greek, where the article is used even with names 5: PE17/91
# Modality ### Propositional modality Epistemic modality is concerned with the speaker's attitude towards whether the proposition is true. There are three types which are common in languages:
- (speculative) an expression of uncertainty, e.g. En. *may*: *Where is John? I'm not sure, **he may be in his office** now* - (deductive) an indication of inference from evidence, e.g. En. *must*: *Yes, the lights are on, so **John must be in his office** now* - (assumptive) an indication of inference from experience , e.g. En. *will*: *It's nine o'clock — **John will be in his office** now*
There is then two-way distinction between:
- strength of the conclusion (epistemical possibility vs necessity) - source of the inference (evidence vs experience)
In many languages one of these contrasts is either the only one present in the system or the more important one. Some languages have ways to indicate that the judgement is either weaker or stronger. English, for instance, uses the past tense forms of the modals. These express a lower degree of commitment.
- *may* becomes *might* - *must* becomes *should* (or less commonly *ought to*) - *will* becomes *would* (or *could*)
#### Propositional modality in Quenya Quenya possesses epistemical possibility-necessity contrast with further differentiation in strength. There is no evidence for inference contrast, and it's assumed that either deductive and/or assumptive would be translated as unmarked future. ##### Speculative Tolkien provided several contradicting paradigms for uncertain statements:
- EVS1 (PE22/98): strong *ai* - QVS (PE22/122-3): strong *ai*, weak *au* - EVS2 (PE22/139, 1951): strong *ai* - ***ai** tuluvanye* “I **may** come” - LVS7 (PE22/154, 21-1969): strong *cé*, weak *quí* (see on *Unreality*) - *lá caritas alasaila **cé** nauva* “not doing this **may** prove unwise” - *carë mára **quí** tyarë naxa* “doing good ?may cause evil”
Note that modal particle should directly precede the verb (PE22/97). Otherwise it is interpreted as a conjunction *if*:
- *cé mo formenna tentanes Amanna* “if northwards, it pointed towards Aman”

*cé* 'may' in PE22/154 (21-1969), PE22/158 (22-1969); 'if' in AS (08-1969)

(Also see on *Optative*) ##### Deductive & Assumptive No examples of deductive exists. No clear example of assumptive exists, but we can make an educated guess. > It may be added that even languages that have future tenses that are not formally modal, but belong within the inflectional system, often use these tenses for similar purposes. They are used in an assumptive sense, like English *will*, in, e.g., French and Italian (cf French *ça sera le facteur* 'that'll be the postman') ### Event modality Event modality refers to events which have not taken place yet. The distinction is drawn between conditioning factors, which are:
- external to the subject (he is permitted or ordered to act); - internal to the subject (he is able and/or willing to act);
#### Deontic Similarly to epistemic modality, deontic modality distinguishes between:
- deontic *possibility* (*permissive*), e.g. En. *can* (less often *may*): You **can** go now - deontic *necessity* (*obligative*), e.g. En. *must*: You **must** go now
Additionally we can consider *commissive*, where speaker *commits* themself to do something. In English it is signalled by the modal verb *shall*. "You **shall** not pass!" — where Gandalf commits himself to ensuring that the balrog will not pass the bridge — is a canonic example of commissive. Just as with epistemic modals, the force of the judgements can be weakened:
- *can* becomes *could* (*may* becomes *might*) - *must* becomes *should*
##### Deontic modality in Quenya Tolkien did not explicitly talk about permission and obligation in Quenya, but we have a few words which might fit the slot.
- permissive: - *nai* < NAY “have opportunity, chance or **permission**; be **allowed** by circumstance or way of the world”; - This mostly used where the opportunity or permission is certain or very probable - Overlaps with optative *nai* - *ecë*: *ecë nin?* 'please, may I?'; - *lerta*: *lertan quetë* 'I can (am free to) speak' (there being no obstacle, of promise, secrecy, duty) - Can be interpreted as *abilitive of circumstance* - obligative: - \**moa* < N. *bui* 'I must' - *inya karie·te* 'I have to make it'; - (neg) *vá caris i* 'he is not to do it'; - commissive: - (pos) future: *vanda sina **termaruva** Elenna·nóreo alcar enyalien* “This oath shall stand in memory of the glory of the Land of the Star” - Such use of future can be seen in e.g. French: *Vous l'aurez demain* - (neg) *vá* + future: *vá matuvatye mastanya* “you shan’t eat my bread”
#### Dynamic Dynamic modality expresses the ability and willigness (in English done with *can* and *will* respectively). In many languages there is no formal distinction between permission and ability. In English, however, the distinction is in that *may* is not used to indicate ability. ##### Dynamic modality in Quenya *Abilitive* is expressed in Quenya with **lexical** verbs:
- physical ability: - *polë*: *polin quetë* 'I can (able to) speak' (PE17/181) - (inherent physically or mentally): *curu* (PE22/151) - learned ability: *istan quetë* 'I can (know how to) speak' (PE17/155, cf. French *savoir*: *il sait nager* 'he can swim') - circumstantial ability/possibility: - *lertan quetë* 'I can (am free to) speak' (there being no obstacle, of promise, secrecy, duty) (PE17/160) - *evë* (PE22/151: "of mere possibility according to likelihood, natural probability, etc.") - *ecë*: *ecuva nin carë sa nöa* “I ‘may’ do that tomorrow, I have a chance of doing that tomorrow” - *may* in gloss seems to disqualify this verb (but it is in quotes?)
*Volitive* is only attested in negative constructions:
- (neg) *vá*: *itas vá tuluvanye* 'in that case I won't come'
#### Imperative Most languages have a specific form that can be identified as Imperative. In languages such as English, where the modal systems are marked by modal verbs, the imperative is quite independent of them. But notionally, imperative is closely associated with deontic modals. Unlike in English, in Quenya *Imperative* is a part of its modality system, expressed by an optional particle *á*.
- imperative proper: *á tule* 'come' (PE22/140); - jussive: *á he tuluvar* 'let them come' (PE22/106); - hortative: (PE14/59 had hortative the same as imperative and jussive) - prohibitive: *avá carë* 'don't do it' (WJ/371): (cf Latin *nolo*: *Noite facere* 'Don't do it'; and Welsh *peidio*: *peidiwich â gadael iddo fynd* 'Don't let him go')

\[To Do\] Add description of gradation

#### Optative The subjunctive is frequently used for wishes and fears:
- *Dio vi benedica* 'May God bless you'
The more correct term applicable to Quenya would be *desiderative* and *timitive*. We have examples of two constructions:
- *nai* initially: *nai elye hiruva* - *na* before the verb: *aranielya na tuluva*
The distinction then can be reminiscent of *cé* being used as an epistemic particle before the verb, or conjunction *if* initially. Note that the use of *nai* as a desirative marker was already present in Early Qenya (PE14/59), where *nai* was also the weak marker of epistemic possibility. In this sense the Early Qenya was very similar to the subjunctive use in European languages in this context. #### Purposive Clauses that express purpose are marked with a conjunction plus the subjunctive in Latin and Classical Greek, and similarly in Spanish and Italian:
- *ti scrivo affinché tu capisca la situazione*
We have one purposive sentence in Quenya:
- *mennai Orome tanna lende i erenekkoitanie* “until Orome came hither that he might awake them” (VT27/7)
which potentially can use (defunct) subjunctive. #### Unreality In a large number of languages a clear distinction can be made between real and unreal conditions. In some languages this is marked with the tense alone, in others by a combination of tense and mood. Similarly to the discussion on epistemic and deontic modality, the 'modal-past' weakens the supposition, stating the condition less likely to occur. Conditions that *predict*, in terms of cause and effect, the occurence of one event on condition of another, always require a modal verb in apodosis (both real and unreal):
- If John comes, Bill can leave (real) - If John came, Bill would leave (unlikely) - If John had come, Bill might have left (unreal, past)
Non-predictive conditionals such as *If John came, Mary left*, which merely indicate that if the protasis is true, so is the apodosis, without necessarily implying that there is a cause and effect, have no restrictions on the tense and modality of such sentences. ##### In Quenya PE22/120 system is a verbatim carry-over from [Latin system](https://www.csun.edu/~hcfll004/conditions.html):
- *qe e·kestan, ni·tuluva* “if he asks me, I shall come” : *if* AOR, FT (predictive real) - *qe e·kestuvan, ni·tuluva* “if (on some future occasion) he asks me, then (on that occasion) I shall come” : *if* FT, FT (predictive real, specific) - *aiqe e·kestuvan, (en) ni·tuluva* “if he asked me, I should come” : MOD-*if* FT, (*en*) FT (predictive unlikely) - *qe e·kárie i kirya aldaryas, ni·kauva kiryasta menelyas* “if he finishes the boat by Monday, I shall be able to sail on Wednesday” : *if* PF, FT (predictive real, future reference) - *qe e·káriéva i kirya, ni·kauva kiryasta menelyas* “if he has finished the boat by Monday, I shall be able to sail on Wednesday” : *if* FT-PF, FT (predictive real, specific, future reference) - *qe (ai) e·tule, (san) inye tule yú* “if he comes, I come too” : *if* (MOD) AOR, (san) AOR (non-predictive, present) - *qe (ai) e·tulle, (san) inye tulle yú* “if he came, I came too” : *if* (MOD) PT, (san) PT (non-predictive, past) - *íqa ette tule, (san) inye tule* “when he comes, I come” : *when* AOR, (san) AOR (non-predictive, present) - *qe/illume e·kestanen/kestanelyanen, ni·tulle*; *if/when* PT/IMP, PT (non-predictive, past) - *ai(qe) e·kestanen, en(ai) ni·túlie*; *MOD-if* (*if*) PT, *en* (MOD) PT (predictive unreal, ?past) - *ai(qe) e·kestanen ela, en ni·túlie*; *MOD-if* (*if*) PT NEG, *en* PT (predictive unreal, ?past) - *auve e·kestanen, au ni·túlie*; *MOD-UR-if* PT, MOD-UR PT (predictive unreal, past) - *aiqe ni·káraza (nila) san ette kára(za) yú*; *MOD-if* PR (NEG), *san* PR (predictive unreal, present) - *auve e·kestanen (ela)!* *MOD-UR-if* PT (NEG) (wish unreal)
Compare Latin schema:
ConditionExamplePROTASISAPODOSIS
SIMPLE CONDITION*If he says this, he makes a mistake*Present IndicativePresent Indicative
PRESENT GENERAL CONDITION*Every time he says this, he makes a mistake*Present IndicativePresent Indicative
PAST PARTICULAR CONDITION*If he (has) said this, he (has) made a mistake*Imperfect Indicative, Present Perfect IndicativeImperfect Indicative, Present Perfect Indicative
PAST GENERAL CONDITION*Whenever he said this, he made a mistake*Imperfect Indicative, Present Perfect IndicativeImperfect Indicative
FUTURE-MOST-VIVID CONDITION*If I shall have said this, I shall have made a mistake*Future Perfect IndicativeFuture Perfect Indicative
FUTURE CONDITION (FUTURE-MORE-VIVID)*If he says (will say) this, he will make a mistake*Future IndicativeFuture Indicative
FUTURE-LESS-VIVID CONDITION ("ideal")*If he were to (should) say this, he would make a mistake*Present SubjunctivePresent Subjunctive
PRESENT CONTRARY-TO-FACT CONDITION Imperfect SubjunctiveImperfect Subjunctive
PAST CONTRARY-TO-FACT CONDITION*If he had said this, he would have made a mistake*Past Perfect SubjunctivePast Perfect Subjunctive
with Quenya:
ConditionExamplePROTASISAPODOSIS
SIMPLE CONDITION*If he says this, he makes a mistake**qe (ai)* + Aorist*san* + Aorist
PRESENT GENERAL CONDITION*Every time he says this, he makes a mistake**íqa* + Aorist*san* + Aorist
PAST PARTICULAR CONDITION*If he (has) said this, he (has) made a mistake**qe* + Past?*san* + Past
PAST GENERAL CONDITION*Whenever he said this, he made a mistake**illume* + Imperfect, Past?*san* + Past
FUTURE-MOST-VIVID CONDITION*If I shall have said this, I shall have made a mistake**qe* + Future PerfectFuture
FUTURE CONDITION (FUTURE-MORE-VIVID)*If he says (will say) this, he will make a mistake**qe* + PerfectFuture
FUTURE-LESS-VIVID CONDITION*If he were to (should) say this, he would make a mistake**aiqe* + Future*en* + Future
PRESENT CONTRARY-TO-FACT CONDITION *aiqe* + Present*san* + Present
PAST CONTRARY-TO-FACT CONDITION*If he had said this, he would have made a mistake**ai(qe)* + Past (NEG); *auve* + Past*en(ai)* + Past; *au* + Past
The difference between *aiqe* + Past, *enai* + Past vs *auve* + Past, *au* + Past might be as in:
- *potevo farlo se mi aiutavano* - *avrei potuto farlo se fossi stato più vecchio*
with the 1st, there is an implication that I had the ability and merely needed help to fulfill it, but with the second it is clear that I did not have the ability, but would have had it if (impossibly) I had been older. PE22/138 had differences (*que > quí > íte* in pencil):
- *íte kestallen, tuluvanye*; *if* AOR, FT (predictive real) - *íte kestuvallen, tuluvanye*; *if* FT, FT (predictive improbable) - *aite kestuvallen, tuluvanye*; *MOD-if* FT, FT (predictive improbable) - *(ai)te kestanellen, (ai) tullenye*; (MOD)-if PT, (MOD) PT (predictive unreal past; discarded) - *quílas túleste, san inye túle*; *if*-NEG PT, *san* PT (predictive unreal past) - *au tuluvanye*; MOD-UR FT (wish unreal future; discarded) - *au túlielde (las)*; MOD-UR PFT (NEG) (wish unreal past)
PE22/158 was discarded:
- *quí(ta) la tuldes, náne márie*; *if*-MOD-UR ?NEG PT, PT (predictive unreal past)